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FEDERAL PREEMPTION BY THE AIRLINE
DEREGULATION ACT OF 1978: HOW DO
STATE TORT CLAIMS FARE?
Matthew J. Kelly
Since the first scheduled passenger air transportation service began in
1914,1 the commercial air carrier (airline)2 industry in the United States
has exploded into an enormous business employing over one million
people3 and providing air transportation to more than 500 million pas-
sengers annually." Commentators credit the Airline Deregulation Act of
1978 (ADA)5 with allowing the airline industry to grow to the level it is
today.' However important the ADA is, or has been, to the growth of
the airline industry, though, courts have had much difficulty defining its
scope . This difficulty lies in understanding and defining the limits of the
ADA's express preemption of state laws and state enforcement actions.8
Beginning with the Air Commerce Act of 1926,9 Congress began en-
J.D., May 2000, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law.
1. See AIR TRANSP. ASS'N, THE AIRLINE HANDBOOK 1 (1995). According to the
Air Transport Association, Glenn Curtiss began offering the first scheduled air transporta-
tion on the St. Petersburg-Tampa Air Boat Line on January 1, 1914. See id.
2. Many of the authorities, including statutes and court opinions, relied on in this
Comment use the term "air carrier" to describe the commercial airline industry. For pur-
poses of brevity and clarity, the phrase "air carrier" is replaced by the term "airline"
whenever possible. The use of the phrase "air carrier" is limited to direct quotations only.
3. See BUREAU OF TRANSP. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., BTS-98-S-01,
TRANSPORTATION STATISTICS ANNUAL REPORT, 1998 71 (1998) (reporting statistics,
including employment figures for all transportation industries, through 1996).
4. See id. at 18.
5. See Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.).
6. See generally AIR TRANSP. ASS'N, THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY, COMPETITION,
SERVICE AND PRICES (1999) (asserting that the ADA increased airline competition, effi-
ciency, and service, as well as lowered passenger fares, and increased airline profits by re-
moving government control over the rates an airline may charge, the routes it may fly, and
the markets it may enter).
7. See infra Part II.C (discussing the similarities and differences in some of the cases
that have confronted ADA preemption).
8. See infra Part II.C (demonstrating that ADA preemption jurisprudence is, at best,
piecemeal and incomplete).
9. Pub. L. No. 69-254, 44 Stat. 568 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 49
U.S.C.).
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acting legislation aimed at regulating the fledgling airline industry.' En-
actment of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938" was next, followed by the
Federal Aviation Act of 1958,12 and culminating with the Airline De-
regulation Act of 1978."3
In its efforts to deregulate the airline industry, Congress included a
preemption clause in the ADA that prevents the states from enacting or
enforcing any law or regulation relating to the prices, routes, or services
of an airline. 14 The clause, however, has resulted in uncertainties in the
application of the ADA. 5 These uncertainties arose, in part, because
Congress neither defined the term "services" for purposes of ADA pre-
16emption, nor enumerated the types of state law actions or claims that
fall victim to preemption. 17 Courts left with the task of construing the
federal statute on their own have defined the term "services" differently
and arrived at different conclusions as to what types of state law claims
10. This Comment draws much of its information regarding the history of congres-
sional regulation of airlines from the legislative history of the Federal Aviation Act of
1958. See H.R. REP. No. 85-2360, at 3-4 (1958), reprinted in 1958 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3741,
3743-44; see also Adam A. Milani, Living in the World: A New Look at the Disabled in the
Law of Torts, 48 CATH. U. L. REV. 323, 381-82 (1999); John T. Houchin, Note, Harris v.
American Airlines: Flying Through the Turbulence of Federal Preemption and the Airline
Deregulation Act, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 955, 959-60 (1997); and Kyle Volluz, Comment,
The Aftermath of Morales and Wolens: A Review of the Current State of Federal Preemp-
tion of State Law Claims Under the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, 62 J. AIR L. & COM.
1195, 1196-98 (1997).
11. Pub. L. No. 75-706, 52 Stat. 973 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 49
U.S.C.).
12. Pub. L. No. 85-726, 72 Stat. 731 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 49
U.S.C.).
13. Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 49
U.S.C.).
14. The original preemption clause read: "[N]o State ... shall enact or enforce any
law, rule, regulation, standard, or other provision having the force and effect of law relat-
ing to rates, routes, or services of any air carrier." 49 U.S.C. § 1305(a)(1) (Supp. 111976),
amended by 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1) (1994).
In 1994, Congress revised title 49 of the United States Code. See Revision of Title 49,
U.S.C., Pub. L. No. 103-272, 108 Stat. 745 (1994). After the revision of title 49, the pre-
emption clause read: "[A] State ... may not enact or enforce a law, regulation, or other
provision having the force and effect of law related to a price, route, or service of an air
carrier." See 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1) (1994). Although the language of the current pre-
emption clause is slightly different from its predecessor, Congress did not intend the
changes to be substantive. See H.R. REP. No. 103-180, at 3 (1994), reprinted in 1994
U.S.C.C.A.N. 818, 820 (stating that "[i]n making changes in the language, precautions
have been taken against making substantive changes in the law").
15. See infra Part II.C.
16. See 49 U.S.C. § 41713(a)-(b).
17. See id.
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are subject to preemption. 8 As a result, state law claims have survived
preemption in one jurisdiction but have fallen in another.' 9 The lack of
uniformity among jurisdictions leaves state law claimants, particularly
tort plaintiffs and the airlines, without clear legal precedent to help them
decide the appropriate state law claims to bring or defenses to assert. 20
Under current law, neither state plaintiffs nor airlines know whether a
state law claim relates to services, or is the type of claim subject to pre-
emption, except in a few circumstances.2 '
This Comment first briefly discusses the history of federal regulation
over the airline industry. Then, this Comment explores the litigation that
has attempted to define the scope of ADA preemption. Next, this
Comment discusses state tort law and the legal ramifications of allowing
state tort claims against airlines to proceed. This Comment distinguishes
between state law tort claims that involve bodily injury or death and non-
bodily injury tort claims, accepting facilely that bodily injury or death
tort claims are preemption proof. Finally, this Comment concludes that a
clear definition of the term "services" is necessary to resolve inter-
jurisdictional conflict, and that non-bodily injury tort claims, without
congressional action or Supreme Court construction, fall victim to ADA
preemption.22
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF CONGRESSIONAL REGULATION OF THE
AIRLINE INDUSTRY
Congress' first major legislation directed toward commercial aviation
18. See infra Part II.C.
19. See id.
20. See id. But see infra text accompanying note 22 (citing an opposing view that,
notwithstanding the state of the law at the time, Congress' intent was not to preempt state
tort law).
21. See infra Part II.C. As discussed below, state plaintiffs and airlines can determine
in some circumstances whether they have brought an appropriate claim or asserted an ap-
propriate defense. The Supreme Court has construed the ADA's preemption clause to
apply to claims based on state consumer protection laws, and has excepted routine breach
of contract claims, such as claims that require judicial enforcement of only the bargain be-
tween the parties, from the purview of ADA preemption. See infra Part II.A-B.
22. But see Houchin, supra note 10, at 968-71 (arguing that the Ninth Circuit ignored
congressional intent in finding that the ADA preempted the non-bodily injury tort claims
at issue in Harris v. American Airlines, Inc., 55 F.3d 1472 (9th Cir. 1995)).
The Ninth Circuit confirmed Houchin's arguments not long after his publication. In an
en banc decision in late 1998, the Ninth Circuit reversed its position and held that Con-
gress did not intend to supplant state tort law, including the non-bodily injury tort claim
alleged in Harris, through the ADA preemption clause. See Charas v. Trans World Air-
lines, Inc., 160 F.3d 1259, 1266 (9th Cir. 1998).
Catholic University Law Review
was the Air Commerce Act of 1926.23 This Act vested regulatory
authority over navigable airspace upon at least four distinct entities: the
Department of Commerce, the President, the Department of Defense,
and the states.24
Realizing that vesting authority over navigable airspace with many dif-
ferent entities would cause conflict in the growing airline industry," Con-
gress enacted the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 (CAA).26 The CAA was
designed to give one government agency authority over navigable air-
space, thus creating the Civil Aeronautics Authority,27 later renamed the
Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB). 28  Congress also enacted a general
remedies saving clause as part of the CAA providing that the CAA
would not alter any common law or statutory remedies then in exis-
tence.29
The Federal Aviation Act of 1958 (FAA)30 created the Federal Avia-
tion Agency, whose functions, powers, and duties were later transferred
31the Federal Aviation Administration, to promote civil aviation, prom-
ulgate safety regulations, and establish and enforce air traffic and naviga-
tional rules.2  Although the FAA retained the CAB,33 its powers were
23. Pub. L. No. 69-254, 44 Stat. 568 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 49
U.S.C.).
24. See id. Under the Air Commerce Act of 1926, Congress vested with the Secretary
of Commerce regulatory authority over, among other things, establishing navigational
rules. See id. §§ 2-4, 44 Stat. at 569-71. The Air Commerce Act also recognized the
authority of the Secretary of War to designate routes in navigable airspace for military
purposes, see id. § 5(f), 44 Stat. at 571-72, granted the President the authority to set aside
airspace reservations for national defense and public safety purposes, see id. § 4, 44 Stat. at
570, and allowed the states to reserve airspace as long as the reservation did not conflict
with the President's-or the military's-reservations. See id.
25. See H.R. REP. No. 85-2360, at 3 (1958), reprinted in 1958 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3741, 3743
(asserting that "a pattern of division of responsibility in air-safety rulemaking and the allo-
cation of navigational airspace was established [by the Air Commerce Act of 1926], to
plague civil and military air operations down to the present time .... ").
26. Pub. L. No. 75-706, 52 Stat. 973 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 49
U.S.C.).
27. See id. § 201, 52 Stat. at 980-81.
28. The Civil Aeronautics Authority was renamed the Civil Aeronautics Board under
Reorganization Plan No. IV of 1940, § 7, 54 Stat. 1234, 1235-36. See also Morales v. Trans
World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 422 n.2 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
29. See § 1106, 52 Stat. at 1027.
30. Pub. L. No. 85-726, 72 Stat. 731 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 49
U.S.C.).
31. See Department of Transportation Act, Pub. L. No. 89-670, §§ 3(e)(1), 6(c)(1), 80
Stat. 931, 932, 938 (1966). Section 3(e)(1) established the Federal Aviation Administra-
tion and section 6(c)(1) transferred the authority of the Federal Aviation Agency to the
Federal Aviation Administration. See id.
32. See § 103, 72 Stat. at 740.
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limited to overseeing certain areas of the industry, including economic
regulation.M The FAA left undisturbed the general remedies saving
clause enacted in the CAA.33
The strict regulatory scheme established under the CAA, as amended
by the FAA, led Congress to enact the Airline Deregulation Act of
1978.3' The ADA allowed the airline industry to enhance competition
and removed perceived onerous economic restrictions placed on airlines
by the CAB.37 The ADA terminated certain portions of the CAB's
authority and gradually transferred the remainder to other government
departments," with the ultimate goal of phasing out the CAB com-pletely.39 To prevent the states from regulating what Congress was be-
33. See id. §§ 201-205, 72 Stat. at 741-44.
34. See id. §§ 204, 401-416, 72 Stat. at 743, 754-71.
35. The saving clause, as originally codified, provided that "[niothing contained in
this [Act] shall in any way abridge or alter the remedies now existing at common law or by
statute, but the provisions of this [Act] are in addition to such remedies." 49 U.S.C. § 1506
(1976). After the revision of title 49, see Revision of Title 49, U.S.C., Pub. L. No. 103-272,
108 Stat. 745 (1994), the saving clause was re-codified at 49 U.S.C. § 40120(c) (1994), with-
out substantive change. See H.R. REP. No. 103-180, at 3 (1994), reprinted in 1994
U.S.C.C.A.N. 818, 820. The saving clause now reads: "A remedy under this part is in addi-
tion to any other remedies provided by law." 49 U.S.C. § 40120(c).
36. Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705.
37. See H.R. REP. No. 95-1211, at 1-2 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3737,
3737 (observing that airlines were "subject to extensive economic regulation by the CAB"
and did not enjoy "the same control over basic operational decisions as management in
other industries"); see also H.R. CONF. REP. No. 95-1779, at 53-56 (1978), reprinted in
1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3773, 3773-75 (setting out a joint statement submitted by certain mem-
bers of Congress that established specific programs for increased competition).
Interestingly, some viewed the CAB not as an overly restrictive agency but more as a
paternalistic program necessary for the survival of the commercial airline industry. As one
journalist who reported on the CAB wrote in his 1974 book:
[T]he big battles today are among the airlines: Pan American vs. TWA; Eastern
vs. National; United vs. American.
The airlines, like Killarney cats, would cheerfully swallow each other up, if given
half a chance. But Congress created the Civil Aeronautics Board in 1938 to
check, or at least control-hopefully, in the public interest-the self-destructive
tendencies of the air transport companies.
CAB's relationship to the airlines can perhaps be compared to the governor on a
steam engine. When the airlines begin to over-reach themselves, and the indus-
try starts to spin too fast, the [CAB] has ways of damping down the action before
it gets out of control. And when the airlines find themselves in a period of stag-
nation, as happens now and again, the CAB seeks ways to help stimulate lagging
traffic growth.
ROBERT BURKHARDT, CAB -THE CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD vii (1974).
Congress obviously saw it differently and, a few short years after Mr. Burkhardt's publi-
cation, began the dismantling of the CAB. See infra notes 39-41 (delineating the demise of
the CAB).
38. See ADA, Pub. L. No. 95-504, § 1601, 92 Stat. at 1744-45.
39. See id. § 1601(a)(4), 92 Stat. at 1745 (providing that "[T]itle II of [the FAA] shall
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ginning to deregulate, Congress included a clause in the ADA forbidding
the states from regulating the industry's prices, routes, or services." The
ADA, however, neither defined the term "services" nor delineated the
parameters of its preemptive effect.
4
'
II. SETTING THE STAGE FOR CONFUSION: THE SUPREME COURT
ENUNCIATES THE GENERAL RULE AND THE EXCEPTIONS TO THE RULE,
BUT GIVES THE LOWER COURTS LITTLE GUIDANCE
A. Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.: The Supreme Court Hears the
First Airline Deregulation Act Preemption Case
The Supreme Court first confronted the ADA's preemption clause in
Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.42 At issue in Morales was whether
the ADA preempted the Air Travel Industry Enforcement Guidelines
(Guidelines) adopted by the National Association of Attorneys General
(NAAG).43 The attorneys general argued that the Guidelines were not
subject to ADA preemption because the Guidelines were not laws within
the meaning of the ADA, but rather only detailed rules explaining how
the various states' laws applied to fare advertising, frequent flyer pro-
grams, and flight overbooking.44
cease to be in effect on January 1, 1985"). Title II of the FAA maintained the CAB and
described its powers and duties. See FAA, Pub. L. No. 85-726, §§ 201-205, 72 Stat. at
741-44. Prior to the expiration date set forth under the ADA, Congress enacted the Civil
Aeronautics Board Sunset Act of 1984 (Sunset Act), Pub. L. No. 98-443, 98 Stat. 1703.
Congress enacted the Sunset Act to clarify and complete the program of deregulation be-
gun by the ADA, and the transfer of authority and abolishment of the CAB. See H.R.
REP. No. 98-793, at 1 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2857. The Sunset Act ulti-
mately terminated the CAB and transferred some of its functions to the Department of
Transportation. See §§ 3-4, 98 Stat. at 1703-05.
40. See Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 378 (1992) (stating that
the preemption clause was included in the ADA "[t]o ensure that the States would not
undo federal deregulation with regulation of their own"); see also H.R. CONF. REP. No.
95-1779, at 94-95 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3773, 3804-05 (discussing the ap-
proaches of both congressional houses to preemption under the ADA).
Before enactment of the ADA, even the CAB did not have unfettered power to regu-
late the airlines. See, e.g., § 401(e), 72 Stat. at 755. This section of the FAA declared:
No term, condition, or limitation of a certificate [of public convenience and ne-
cessity issued by the CAB] shall restrict the right of an air carrier to add to or
change schedules, equipment, accommodations, and facilities for performing the
authorized transportation and service as the development of the business and the
demands of the public shall require.
Id.; cf 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b) (1994) (ADA preemption clause).
41. See 49 U.S.C. § 41713(a)-(b).
42. 504 U.S. 374 (1992).
43. See id. at 378-79.
44. See id. at 379. The Court described the Guidelines as "detailed standards gov-
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The Court determined that the ADA preempted the Guidelines, and
the state laws underlying them, because they related to the airlines'
41rates. In concluding that the Guidelines were subject to ADA preemp-
tion, the Court focused on the phrase "relating to" in the preemption
clause. 4' Reading the ordinary language of the preemption clause, the
Court determined that it "express[ed] a broad pre-emptive purpose.,
41
To reinforce its determination that the ADA preemption clause has a
broad purpose, the Court compared similar preemptive language con-
tained in the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
(ERISA), 48 and cases construing that language, with the ADA's preemp-
tion clause. 49 Those cases, the Court noted, held that the language of
ERISA's preemption clause expressed a broad preemptive purpose and,
by analogy, the ADA's preemption clause also expressed a broad pre-
emptive purpose.5O
The proponents of the Guidelines at issue in Morales raised five
objections to preemption by the ADA,51 but the Court rejected all of
them.52 In striking down the proponents' arguments seriatim, the Court
began to define the scope of preemption under the ADA. First, the
erning the content and format of airline advertising, the awarding of premiums to regular
customers.., and the payment of compensation to passengers who voluntarily yield their
seats on overbooked flights." Id. The attorneys general maintained that the Guidelines
merely explained "'how existing state laws apply to air fare advertising and frequent flyer
programs." Id.
45. See id. at 388-91.
46. See id. at 383 (declaring that "[f]or purposes of the present case, the key phrase,
obviously, is 'relating to."').
47. Id. at 384 (relying on BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY definitions).
48. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-1461
(1994)). The pertinent part of the ERISA preemption clause: "[T]he provisions of this
subchapter and subchapter III of this chapter shall supersede any and all State laws insofar
as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan described in section
1003(a) of this title...." 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a).
49. See Morales, 504 U.S. at 383-84.
50. See id. The Court also observed:
[Morales] appears to us much like Pilot Life [Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41
(1987)], in which we held that a common-law tort and contract action seeking
damages for the failure of an employee benefit plan to pay benefits "relate[d] to"
employee benefit plans and was pre-empted by ERISA.
Id. at 388 (second alteration in original).
51. See id. at 384-87. To invalidate each of the proponents' objections to preemption,
the Supreme Court, with one exception, deferred to its ERISA precedent. See id. at 384-
87. The Court did not need to analogize ERISA precedent to dismiss the assertion by the
proponents of the Guidelines that the ADA only preempts the states from actually pre-
scribing prices, routes, or services. Rather, the Court read the language of the preemption
clause and determined that such a view "simply reads the words 'relating to' out of the
statute." Id. at 385.
52. See id. at 384.
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Guidelines' proponents argued that construing the ADA's preemption
clause by comparing ERISA's preemptive language was inapposite be-
cause the breadth of ERISA preemption derives from language other
than the ADA's similar "related to" language. 3 The Court determined
that ERISA is an appropriate statute with which to analyze the ADA be-
cause of the similarities in the language between their respective preemp-
tion clauses. 4 Additionally, the Court analogized ADA preemption to
ERISA preemption jurisprudence, which relies heavily on the express
preemption clause and the interpretation of the phrase "relates to."55
Second, the proponents argued that the saving clause, still in effect af-
ter Congress enacted the ADA, was broader than its ERISA counter-
part; thus, the ADA's preemption clause did not reach state common law
and statutory claims. 6 Although it recognized that the saving clause re-
mains in the United States Code, the Court decided that the saving clause
was not controlling in the face of an express preemption clause. 7
Third, the proponents contended that the ADA only forbids the states
from directly regulating airline rates, routes, or services, and because the
drafters of the Guidelines based them on general state consumer protec-
tion laws, the Guidelines escaped preemption. The broad interpretation
of the "relating to" language in the ADA led the Court to conclude,
however, that the ADA's preemption clause is not limited only to those
state laws or actions that actually seek to prescribe rates, routes, or serv-
ices.59
Next, the proponents asserted that the ADA only preempts state laws
specifically directed at the airline industry, not laws of general applica-
53. See id. The petitioner believed that the sweeping preemption under ERISA de-
rived not from the language of the preemption clause, but from the "'the wide and inclu-
sive sweep of the comprehensive ERISA scheme."' Id. (quoting Brief for Petitioner).
54. See id.
55. See id.
56. See id.
57. See id. at 384-85. In addressing the saving clause, the Court stated:
[It is a commonplace of statutory construction that the specific governs the gen-
eral, a canon particularly pertinent here, where the "saving" clause is a relic of
the pre-ADA/no pre-emption regime. A general "remedies" saving clause can-
not be allowed to supersede the specific substantive pre-emption provision ....
[W]e do not believe Congress intended to undermine this carefully drawn statute
through a general saving clause.
Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted).
58. See id. at 385-86.
59. See id. (declaring that such a view "simply reads the words 'relating to' out of the
statute").
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bility.6° Because of the breadth of the ADA's preemptive scope, the
Court held that state laws with general applicability are preempted; to
hold otherwise "ignores the sweep of the 'relating to' language.",61 In
other words, because of its breadth, the ADA preempts laws that do not
specifically address the airline industry. 62
Fifth, the proponents argued that because the Guidelines were consis-
tent with federal law on the issues they addressed, the Guidelines were
61
not subject to the preemption clause. In rejecting the petitioners' fifth
argument, the Court held that ADA even preempts state laws that are
consistent with federal law.64
In Morales, the Court noted an exception to the ADA's broad preemp-
tive effect.65 If a claim relates to the prices, routes, or services of an air-
line "in too tenuous, remote or peripheral a manner," the claim may sur-
vive preemption. 66 The Court did not define any other terms in the
preemption clause, including "rates," "routes," and most notably, "serv-
ices., 67 The holding in Morales demonstrates that the ADA preempts
claims based on a particular state's consumer protection laws.6
60. See id. at 386.
61. Id. (citing, inter alia, Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41 (1987), which held
that ERISA preempts common law tort and contract actions). In Harris v. Ford Motor
Co., 110 F.3d 1410, 1414 n.8 (9th Cir. 1997), the court of appeals noted that state tort laws
are laws of general applicability. This definition of the nature of state tort law becomes an
important issue later in this Comment. See infra Part III.A-C; see also infra note 155 and
accompanying text.
62. See Morales, 504 U.S. at 386.
63. See id.
64. See id. at 387.
65. See id. at 390.
66. See id. (quoting Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 100 n.21 (1983)).
67. The Court did discuss airlines' rates, but did not proffer a definition. See id. at
387. The Court observed: "[I]t is hardly surprising that petitioner rests most of his case on
such strained readings of [the preemption clause], rather than contesting whether the
NAAG guidelines really 'relat[e] to' fares. They quite obviously do." Id. (second altera-
tion in original); see also id. at 388 (concluding that "[o]ne cannot avoid the conclusion
that... the guidelines 'relate to' airline rates. In its terms, every one of the guidelines ...
bears a 'reference to' airfares.").
68. See id. at 378 (framing the issue as whether the ADA "pre-empts the States from
prohibiting allegedly deceptive airline fare advertisements through enforcement of their
general consumer protection statutes"). The Court ultimately concluded that the states
may not enforce their consumer protection laws against the airlines. See id. at 390-91.
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B. American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens: Preemption Under the Airline
Deregulation Act Revisited
The Supreme Court next confronted ADA preemption in American
Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens.69 The plaintiffs in Wolens filed suit against the
airline because the airline unilaterally devalued the plaintiffs' frequent
flyer credits." The plaintiffs alleged that the airline violated the Illinois
Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act" and was in
breach of contract.72 The airline asserted that the ADA preempted both
causes of action." The airline did not argue, however, that its contracts
were not enforceable; instead, they contended that the Department of
Transportation should decide such matters, not state courts.74 The Court
rejected components of each party's arguments.
First, the Court rejected the plaintiffs' claims under the Illinois con-
sumer protection legislation and held, as it did in Morales, that the ADA
preempts claims based on that type of legislation. Second, the Court
carved out an additional exception to the ADA's preemptive effect on
state law claims: standard breach of contract claims against airlines sur-
vive preemption under the ADA if those claims merely seek judicial en-
forcement of the obligations undertaken by the airlines.76 In arriving at
this conclusion, the Court interpreted the phrase "enact or enforce any
law" in the ADA preemption clause to mean obligations placed upon the
airlines by the states,77 but not judicial enforcement of obligations under-
69. 513 U.S. 219 (1995).
70. See id. at 222, 224-25. The devaluation occurred because the airline instituted a
policy that limited the number of seats that persons obtaining tickets with frequent flyer
credits could occupy, and because the airlines excluded certain time periods when passen-
gers could obtain tickets with frequent flyer credits (so-called "blackout dates"). See id. at
225. The plaintiffs in Wolens brought two causes of action-one for breach of contract
and the other for a violation of the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act and Deceptive Business
Practices Act. See id. The plaintiffs conceded that the airline had a contractual right to
change the terms of the frequent flyer program unilaterally. See id. Thus, the plaintiffs'
grounded their complaint on the argument that the airline's change in policy was retroac-
tive against frequent flyer credits already earned. See id.
71. 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 505/2 (West 1999); see Wolens, 513 U.S. at 225.
72. See Wolens, 513 U.S. at 225.
73. See id. at 228-29, 230-32.
74. See id. at 230-32.
75. See id. at 228 (holding that the ADA preemption clause "preempts plaintiffs'
claims under the Consumer Fraud Act").
76. See id. at 228-29.
77. See id. at 226-27 (observing that the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act "controls the
primary conduct of those falling within its governance").
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taken by the airlines themselves.78  The Wolens Court rejected the air-
line's claim that the Department of Transportation should determine
whether the airline breached its contract with its passengers,7 9 and agreed
with the position of the United States, arguing as amicus curiae, 8 that the
Department of Transportation had neither the authority nor the re-
sources to be the arbiter of such claims.
Similar to Morales, the Wolens decision further clarifies the ADA's
preemptive scope, but again fails to define the term "services" for ADA
purposes. Accordingly, the lower courts have had to make decisions on
how ADA preemption applies to state law claims without the benefit of a
precise definition.82
C. The Lower Courts Struggle to Define the Terms Left Untouched by the
Supreme Court: Differing Interpretations, Treatment, and Outcomes
Since the most recent Supreme Court decision in Wolens, four circuit
courts of appeals have addressed preemption of state law claims under
the ADA directly and each court has reached different results.
1. Hodges v. Delta Airlines, Inc.: A Broad Definition of "Services"
The plaintiff in Hodges v. Delta Airlines, Inc. 83 brought a state claim
against the defendant airline alleging it was negligent for allowing a box
of rum to be stowed in an overhead compartment after the box fell and
struck her when the compartment opened.8 The issue before the court
was the "breadth of [the] express preemption of state law [by the
ADA]."85 In deciding that the plaintiff's tort claims were not subject to
ADA preemption, the Hodges court reasoned that Congress' intent in
enacting the ADA's preemption clause was not to preempt state tort
78. See id. at 227-28. The Court, in comparing Wolens to Morales v. Trans World
Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374 (1992), noted that just like the Guidelines at issue in Morales,
"the [Illinois] Consumer Fraud Act serves as a means to guide and police the ... practices
of the airlines; the Act does not simply give effect to bargains offered by the airlines and
accepted by airline customers." Id. at 228.
79. See id. at 230-31.
80. See id. at 228-29 (quoting the United States' amicus curiae brief).
81. See id. at 232. There, the Court agreed with the United States and stated that
"the DOT has neither the authority nor the apparatus required to superintend a contract
dispute resolution regime." Id.
82. See infra Part II.C.
83. 44 F.3d 334 (5th Cir. 1995) (en banc).
84. See id. at 340.
85. Id. at 335.
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law. 86 It arrived at this conclusion based on a statute that requires air-
lines to carry liability insurance, or be self-insured, for bodily injuries or
87death resulting from the operations or maintenance of an aircraft.
The Hodges court distinguished between the services of an airline and
the operations and maintenance of an aircraft.88 The court found that
claims relating to the operations and maintenance of an aircraft fell im-
plicitly into an exception to ADA preemption created by the compulsory
insurance statute. 9 Rather than finding that the plaintiff's claim related
to "services," the Hodges court found that the claim fell within the opera-
tions and maintenance of the aircraft and was thereby beyond the scope
of ADA preemption.9°
The Hodges court recognized that Morales requires preemption of
state law claims relating to prices, routes, or services, but also noted that
Morales did not define the term "services." 9' Thus, the Hodges court
fashioned its own interpretation of the term."' Notwithstanding the
holding in Hodges, the court adopted a broad definition of the term
"services" in its analysis.93 The court determined that the term "services"
includes items such as ticketing, boarding, provisions of food and bever-
ages, baggage handling, and the actual transportation of passengers.94
86. See id. at 338.
87. See id. This insurance provision of the United States Code was originally codified
at 49 U.S.C. § 1371(q) (1976), and mandated that air carriers maintain insurance, or be
self-insured, to cover "amounts for which ... air carrier[s] may become liable for bodily
injuries to or the death of any person ... resulting from the operation or maintenance of
aircraft." After Congress revised title 49, see Revision of Title 49, U.S.C., Pub. L. No. 103-
272, 108 Stat. 745 (1994), this section was re-codified in substance at 49 U.S.C. § 41112(a)
(1994).
The Hodges court believed that Congress did not intend to preempt state law personal
injury claims in light of the compulsory insurance provision of the United States Code. See
Hodges, 44 F.3d at 338. The court stated that "Congress did not.., intend [the ADA] to
preempt all state claims for personal injury" because "[a]ir carriers are required to main-
tain [liability] insurance or self insurance .... Congress explicitly preserved airlines' duty
to respond to tort actions, inferentially state law actions, for physical injury or property
damage." Id. at 338-39.
88. See Hodges, 44 F.3d at 338-39.
89. See id. at 339-40.
90. See id. at 340.
91. See id. at 336 (observing that "Morales commands that whatever state laws 'relate
to rates, routes or services' are broadly preempted, but it does not define 'services').
92. See id. at 336-37.
93. See id.
94. See id. at 336. The court in Hodges stated:
"Services" generally represent a bargained-for or anticipated provision of labor
from one party to another. If the element of bargain or agreement is incorpo-
rated in our understanding of services, it leads to a concern with the contractual
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This was the first, and perhaps the broadest, definition of "services" that
any circuit court had advanced to date.95
2. Travel All Over the World, Inc. v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia:
Reliance on the Hodges Definition of Services
Evaluating the plaintiffs' allegations of breach of contract, defamation,
and other tort causes of action, the court in Travel All Over the World,
Inc. v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia9 found that the breach of contract claim
survived preemption under the ADA.97 Plaintiffs' based their breach of
contract claim on the defendant airline's cancellation of their clients'
flights because the plaintiffs lost the commissions on the reservations
they sold.98
In determining that the breach of contract claim was safe from federal
preemption, the court reasoned that the underlying contract was a self-
imposed obligation undertaken by the airline, rather than a state-
imposed obligation." Asserting that federal regulations govern its
"bumping" practices, the airline argued that the court cannot look only
to the privately ordered undertakings of the parties, but must also ex-
amine federal regulations to determine whether a breach occurred as a
result of the "bumping."' ° The defendant argued that the Wolens excep-
tion to preemption, i.e., the survival of routine breach of contract claims
based on the airline's self-imposed obligations, did not apply to the plain-
arrangement between the airline and the user of the service. Elements of the air
carrier service include items such as ticketing, boarding procedures, provision of
food and drink, and baggage handling, in addition to the transportation itself.
These matters are all appurtenant and necessarily included with the contract of
carriage between the passenger ... and the airline. It is these [contractual] fea-
tures of air transportation that we believe Congress intended to de-regulate as
"services" and broadly to protect from state regulation.
Id. (quoting with approval the panel decision in Hodges v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 4 F.3d 350,
354 (5th Cir. 1993) (alteration in original).
95. See Hodges, 44 F.3d at 336. A blurry dichotomy was enunciated in Hodges be-
cause of the court's reliance on the compulsory insurance statute. See id. at 338-39. That
statute requires airlines to carry insurance to cover damages resulting from the "operation
or maintenance of the aircraft." See 49 U.S.C. § 41112(a). The court distinguished be-
tween the operations and maintenance of an aircraft and the services of an aircraft, and
hence found that the plaintiff's claims implicated the operation and maintenance of the
aircraft, but not airline services. See Hodges, 44 F.3d at 338-39. Because the court charac-
terized the plaintiff's claims in this way, those tort claims survived preemption under the
ADA. See id.
96. 73 F.3d 1423 (7th Cir. 1996).
97. See id. at 1427-28.
98. See id. at 1428.
99. See id. at 1432.
100. See id.
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tiffs' claims that the ADA preempted them.'0 ' The court in Travel All
Over the World did not accept the defendant's attempt to distinguish
Wolens on a "federal defenses" basis, and instead held that the preemp-
tion of state law claims is not dependent on whether federal regulations
exist that govern the issue."m
In finding that the ADA preempted plaintiffs' other tort claims, the
court in Travel All Over the World adopted the same definition of "serv-
ices" as the court in Hodges.10 3 The court found that the plaintiff's claims
of intentional infliction of emotional distress and fraud, to the extent that
they were based on the defendant's refusal to transport the reserved pas-
sengers,- were preempted by the ADA because they related to the
services of "ticketing as well as the transportation itself."'' 5 Conversely,
the plaintiffs' defamation and slander claims escaped preemption be-
cause they did not relate to the airline's services.
1°6
Both Hodges and Travel All Over the World accepted a broad defini-
tion of the term "services" as it relates to the preemption of state law
claims.'O° Additionally, the results arrived at by the two courts do not dif-
fer significantly because the claims at issue in Travel All Over the World
101. See id.
102. See id. The court asserted that "It]he question of whether a State has 'enacted or
enforced a law' cannot depend on the existence of federal regulations in the same area."
Id. Curiously, however, after making this assertion, the court indicated in a footnote that
federal regulations could preempt state law claims by implication, but that the court would
only imply preemption when a state claim is in conflict with the federal regulations. See id.
at 1432 n.9. This revelation by the court seems to be inimical to the Supreme Court's
opinion in Morales:
Nothing in the language of [the ADA] suggests that its "relating to" pre-emption
is limited to inconsistent state regulation; and once again our ERISA cases have
settled the matter: The pre-emption provision ... displaces all state laws that fall
within its sphere, even including state laws that are consistent with ERISA's sub-
stantive requirements.
Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 386-87 (1992) (internal quotations,
citations, and alterations omitted) (emphasis added).
Necessarily, states would be required to look to federal law and regulations to deter-
mine whether a state law cause of action lies. See Smith v. Comair, Inc., 134 F.3d 254, 258
(4th Cir. 1.998)
103. See Travel All Over the World, 73 F.3d at 1433 (quoting with approval Hodges v.
Delta Airlines, Inc., 44 F.3d 334, 336 (1995) (en banc)).
104. See id. at 1434. The court did indicate, however, that these claims may survive
independent of the defendant's refusal to transport if the claims were based on the false
statements alleged in the defamation and slander claims. See id.
105. Id. The plaintiff also asserted a defamation claim against the defendant; however,
the court held that this claim did not relate to services of the airline, and, therefore, was
not subject to preemption. See id. at 1433.
106. See id.
107. See Hodges, 44 F.3d at 336; Travel All Over the World, 73 F.3d at 1433.
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did not implicate the operations or maintenance of an aircraft as did the
claim in Hodges.'8
3. Smith v. Comair, Inc.: Implicit Reliance on the Definition of
"Services" Set Forth in Hodges
The plaintiff in Smith v. Comair, Inc.109 filed a breach of contract action
against the defendant airline for refusing to allow him to board an air-
craft, in addition to tort claims of false imprisonment and intentional in-
fliction of emotional distress.'10 The issue before the Smith court was the
ADA's preemptive scope because the Fourth Circuit had not yet consid-
ered it."'
The airline asserted defenses under federal law that give broad discre-
tion to airlines, allowing them to refuse boarding to passengers it believes
pose a safety risk."' In addition, the airline asserted that the plaintiff did
not comply with the Federal Aviation Administration's safety directive
that imposes an affirmative duty on the airlines to refuse boarding if a
passenger does not present proper identification."3 In passing on the
plaintiff's breach of contract claim, the Smith court determined that the
Wolens exception was not controlling because the claim could only be re-
solved by looking to sources of law outside the parties' agreement,
namely federal statutes, regulations, and Federal Aviation Administra-
108. See Hodges, 44 F.3d at 339. The Hodges court recognized that the "general vindi-
cation of state tort claims arising from the maintenance or operation of aircraft does not
extend to all conceivable state tort claims." Id. (emphasis omitted). The court then ob-
served that O'Carroll v. American Airlines, Inc., 863 F.2d 11 (5th Cir. 1989), is one such
case that illustrates that point. See Hodges, 44 F.3d at 339. The plaintiff's claim in
O'Carroll that he was wrongfully excluded from a flight was preempted by the ADA be-
cause "[nlo claim was made that the airline breached any safety-related tort duty by
bumping O'Carroll." Id. at 339. As in O'Carroll, the plaintiffs in Travel All Over the
World did not allege any tort involving airline safety. See Travel All Over the World,
73 F.3d at 1428 (alleging "breach of contract, tortious interference with a business rela-
tionship, defamation, slander, fraud, [and] intentional infliction of emotional distress").
The Hodges court noted that the Fifth Circuit's interpretation sub judice and in
O'Carroll was in conflict with the Ninth Circuit's opinion in West v. Northwest Airlines,
Inc., 995 F.2d 148 (9th Cir. 1993). See Hodges, 44 F.3d at 339-40. In West, the Ninth Cir-
cuit held that the plaintiff's claim that the airline wrongfully bumped him from an over-
booked flight did not relate to "services" and was not preempted by the ADA. See id.
The Hodges court further observed that "[ulnder either Morales or the analysis advanced
here, it is difficult to see how a lawsuit for overbooking would not 'relate to' the airline's
contract for 'services' with its passenger." Id. at 340.
109. 134 F.3d 254 (4th Cir. 1998).
110. See id. at 256.
111. Seeid. at 257.
112. See id. at 257-58; see also 49 U.S.C. § 44902(b) (1994).
113. See Smith, 134 F.3d at 256.
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tion directives.'
The Smith court determined that the ADA also preempted the re-
maining tort claims to the extent they were based on the airline's refusal
to allow the plaintiff to board the aircraft because the denied boarding
related to the "services" of the airline. "5 Although the Smith court did
not attempt to define the scope of the term "services" within the mean-
ing of the ADA, it did rely on Hodges to imply that boarding procedures
of the airline are "services.'. 6 Thus, the Fourth Circuit joined the Fifth
and Seventh Circuits in utilizing the broad definition of "services" first
enunciated in Hodges."7
4. Charas v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.: A Polar Opposite Approach
and a Bare Bones Definition of "Services"
Although the above three circuits took a broad approach to the defini-
tion of "services,""' 8 the Ninth Circuit took an exceptionally limited view
114. See id. at 258 (observing that the plaintiff's claim could only "be adjudicated by
reference to law and policies external to the parties' bargain").
The defendant airline in Travel All Over the World attempted to use this very defense, a
so-called "federal defenses" argument. See Travel All Over the World v. Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia, 73 F.3d 1423, 1432 (7th Cir. 1996). The argument failed. See id. (stating
that whether a state enacts or enforces a law does not depend on federal regulations in the
same area). In Smith, however, this argument succeeded. See Smith, 134 F.3d at 258.
The airline in Hodges also attempted to assert a defense based on federal regulations.
See Hodges v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 44 F.3d 334, 339 n.12 (5th Cir. 1995) (en banc). There,
the airline argued that the "state tort suit should not be permitted to proceed because it
could impose duties that conflict with Federal Aviation Administration regulations gov-
erning carry-on baggage." Id. The court dismissed the airline's contention because
"[t]here [were] no facts in the record that intimate the basis for such a conflict." Id.
115. See Smith, 134 F.3d at 259. The court also found that the two intentional tort
claims failed to state a claim as a matter of state law. See id. at 259-60.
116. See id. at 259. The Smith court also relied on Chukwu v. Board of Directors Brit-
ish Airways, 101 F.3d 106 (1st Cir. 1996), to imply that boarding procedures are services
within the meaning of the ADA.
117. See Hodges v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 4 F.3d 350, 354 (5th Cir. 1993) (adopted with
approval in Hodges, 44 F.3d at 337). Even though the Fourth, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits
appear to rely on a broad interpretation of the term "services," the way in which each cir-
cuit has applied the definition is different. Compare Smith, 134 F.3d at 259 (holding that
false imprisonment and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims related to serv-
ices and therefore preempted), with Hodges, 44 F.3d at 338-39 (holding that tort claims did
not relate to services, rather they related to the operations and maintenance of the aircraft
and were not preempted), with Travel All Over the World, 73 F.3d at 1434 (holding that
intentional infliction of emotional distress and fraud claims related to services and were
preempted).
118. See, e.g., Hodges, 44 F.3d at 334; Travel All Over the World, 73 F.3d at 1423;
Smith, 134 F.3d at 254.
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of the term in Charas v. Trans World Airlines, Inc."9 Charas involved
several individual cases consolidated for the purposes of en banc re-
view. All of the plaintiffs filed negligence claims against the defendant
airlines." In expressly overturning two other cases from the same circuit
that took a broader view of the term "services" and of the ADA's pre-
emptive effect,'122 the Charas court, much like the court in Hodges,' did
not believe that Congress intended to preempt all state law personal in-
jury claims.22 The court, however, did diverge from Hodges in two re-
spects.
First, the Charas court disagreed that claims related to operations and
maintenance of an aircraft escape preemption while claims relating to
services are subject to preemption because such a distinction creates an
unworkable dichotomy.' Second, the Charas court differed from
Hodges in its interpretation of the term "services," and fashioned a se-
verely limited definition, encompassing only the transportation itself.
2 1
119. 160 F.3d 1259, 1265-66 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc).
120. See id. at 1261 n.1.
121. See id. at 1261-62.
122. The court expressly overruled Harris v. American Airlines, Inc., 55 F.3d 1472 (9th
Cir. 1995) (holding claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligence, and
violation of state public accommodation law preempted under the ADA), and Gee v.
Southwest Airlines, 110 F.3d 1400 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding two of four separate plaintiffs'
claims for emotional distress and negligence preempted). The Charas decision only over-
ruled these two cases "to the extent that they [were] inconsistent with [the court's] inter-
pretation." Charas, 160 F.3d at 1261. The ADA did not preempt all of the claims in Gee,
and the Charas opinion appears to have preserved some of the original rulings of the
three-judge panel. See Gee, 110 F.3d at 1404-08.
The Gee court found that the ADA preempted two of the plaintiffs' safety-related per-
sonal injury torts, but did not preempt two other plaintiffs' non-saftey related emotional
injury torts. See id. The Charas opinion apparently overruled only the Gee court's hold-
ing that the two safety-related tort claims are preempted, while preserving the Gee court's
findings that non-safety related tort claims survive preemption. See Charas, 160 F.3d at
1261. The only preemption of the safety-related tort claims were those inconsistent with
the court's holding in Charas. See id.
123. 44 F.3d 334, 338 (5th Cir. 1995).
124. See Charas, 160 F.3d at 1261. The court determined that "Congress intended to
preempt only state laws and lawsuits that would adversely affect the economic deregula-
tion of the airlines and the forces of competition within the airline industry," but "did not
intend to preempt passengers' run-of-the-mill personal injury claims." Id.
125. See id. at 1261, 1263; see also infra notes 127-28 (discussing the differences of the
court's opinion from the Fifth Circuit's opinion in Hodges).
126. See Charas, 169 F.3d at 1263 (noting that "the distinction [enunciated in Hodges]
between an airline's operations and its service turn[s] out to be as elusive as it is unwork-
able").
127. See id. at 1261. The court defined services as:
[T]he prices, schedules, origins and destinations of the point-to-point transporta-
tion of passengers, cargo, or mail. In the context in which it was used in the
Catholic University Law Review
Under the Charas opinion, all of the plaintiffs' tort claims against the de-
fendant airlines escaped ADA preemption.
2 8
Where Hodges and the cases relying on it may represent the broadest
interpretation of the term "services," Charas represents the opposite ex-
treme. These four cases represent the difficulty facing the courts in
evaluating state law claims in relation to the ADA's preemption clause
without the benefit of a clear definition of the term "services."' 2 9 Since
Congress left the task of formulating definitions of key terms in the
ADA to the courts, it is hardly surprising that the application of those
definitions yields different and inconsistent results in the quest to define
the parameters of the preemptive scope of the ADA.'30
III. LESSONS LEARNED: WHAT IS KNOWN ABOUT PREEMPTION UNDER
THE AIRLINE DEREGULATION ACT OF 1978
Although ADA preemption jurisprudence is far from clear, and often
inconsistent, "' Morales and Wolens provide some instruction regarding
the basic framework for ADA preemption. Morales advocates that the
ADA has a broad preemptive purpose 1 2 and that the phrase "relates to"
expresses that purpose. "' The Morales Court concluded that the ADA
preempts state enforcement of legislation aimed, either directly or indi-
rectly, at airlines' prices, routes, or services; claims based on state poli-
cies; "1 and even state laws or enforcement actions that are consistent
with federal law.' The one exception enunciated in Morales removes
[ADA], "service" was not intended to include an airline's provision of in-flight
beverages, personal assistance to passengers, the handling of luggage, and similar
amenities.
Id. But cf. Hodges, 44 F.3d at 336.
128. See Charas, 160 F.3d at 1261.
129. See id. at 1263 (observing that "the scope of [ADA] preemption has been a
source of considerable dispute since its enactment"); see also Volluz, supra note 10, at
1207 (observing that "a far more contentious area of jurisprudence has developed con-
cerning what exactly are 'services' for purposes of the ADA").
130. See supra Parts II.C.1-4 (discussing the similarities and differences between circuit
courts on the definition of "services" and the application of the ADA's preemption clause
to state law tort claims).
131. See supra Parts lI.A-C (discussing the Supreme Court and lower courts' treat-
ment of the ADA preemption clause).
132. See Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 383-84 (1992).
133. See id. at 384 (holding claims that have "a connection with, or reference to, airline
'rates, routes, or services' are pre-empted under [the ADA]").
134. See id. at 385-87; see also supra notes 61, 63-64 and accompanying text (reporting
that Morales stands for the proposition that state laws of specific and general applicability
are subject to the preemption clause).
135. See Morales, 504 U.S. at 385-87.
[Vol. 49:873
2000] Federal Preemption by the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 891
from the ambit of ADA preemption any state law claims that relate too
tenuously to services. 36
Wolens takes the view that breach of contract claims are not pre-
empted if such claims do not seek to effectuate state policies37 because
the phrase "enact or enforce" in the ADA means the imposition of sub-
stantive standards of state law on the airlines."' Additionally, Wolens
hints at what the term "services" means.39 Although Wolens carved out
an exception to ADA preemption, the Court explicitly sustained the
holding in Morales and the general proposition that the ADA preempts
claims based on state consumer protection legislation. 40 What remains
unclear is the ADA's effect on state law claims other than consumer pro-
tection claims14 ' and non-state policy-based breach of contract claims.'
42
Hence, whether the ADA's preemption clause allows survival of state
law tort claims that relate to airlines' services remains an open ques-
tion. 141 Indeed, we cannot ascertain the answer unless Congress or the
courts fashion a precise definition of "services." Additionally, the an-
swer would necessarily change depending on which definition of "serv-
ices" is utilized; for example, the definition crafted by the Charas court
would yield a different result than the interpretation imposed by the
Hodges court.'"
136. See id. at 390 (analogizing ERISA preemption to the ADA and finding that
"'[s]ome state actions may affect [airline fares] in too tenuous, remote, or peripheral a
manner' to have pre-emptive effect").
137. See American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 228 (1995) (holding that the
ADA does not protect the airlines from claims alleging no violation of state law, and air-
lines are subject to claims alleging violations of self-imposed obligations).
138. See id. at 228; see also id. at 232-33 (stating that the ADA, in connection with the
saving clause at 49 U.S.C. § 40120 (c) (1994), "stops States from imposing their own sub-
stantive standards with respect to rates, routes, or services [on airlines]").
139. See id. at 226 (indicating, without expressly limiting, that "services" include "ac-
cess to flights and class-of-service upgrades").
140. See id. at 234-35.
141. See generally Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 222 (finding preemption under the ADA of
state consumer protection legislation); Morales v. Trans World Airlines, 504 U.S. 374, 391
(1992) (same).
142. See Wolens, 513 U.S. at 228.
143. But cf Hodges v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 44 F.3d 334, 340 (5th Cir. 1995) (en banc)
(allowing bodily injury negligence claim to proceed despite ADA preemption clause);
Charas v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 160 F.3d 1259, 1266 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc) (same);
infra Part III.B (discussing whether tort claims alleging bodily injury or death implicitly
survive ADA preemption).
144. Compare Charas, 160 F.3d 1259 (construing a limited definition of services), with
Hodges, 44 F.3d 334 (adopting a broad definition of services).
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A. Fundamental Elements of Tort: Duties, Obligations, and Damages
Imposed Under State Law
A tort is a civil wrong or injury for which the law provides a remedy
that arises out of a breach of duty that is imposed, not by the agreement
of the parties, but by operation of law.14' Negligence, for example, re-
quires a plaintiff to prove a duty owed by one party to another; a breach
of that duty; causation of injury; and damages suffered.' The first ele-
ment of negligence is that a duty must exist.147 Because there is generallynofeeal, 14814
no federal common law, the source of the duty derives from state law. 49
145. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1496 (7th ed. 1999); JOSEPH W. GLANNON, THE
LAW OF TORTS 172 (1995) (professing that "[tiort duties ... do not exist in nature; they
are made up by judges because they conclude that a duty ought to exist under the circum-
stances"); see also Hodges, 44 F.3d at 339 (observing that a defendant's duty to respond to
tort actions is based inferentially on state law.)
146. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 166 (6th ed.
1995).
147. See id.
148. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (finding that, generally, no
federal common law exists). Later opinions have determined that federal common law
may exist, but only in rare circumstances. See, e.g., O'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S.
79, 87 (1994) (stating that situations where judicial creation of special federal rule is war-
ranted are "few and restricted," limited to situations where there is "significant conflict
between some federal policy or interest and the use of state law"); Texas Indus., Inc. v.
Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 641 (1981) (concluding that "absent some congres-
sional authorization to formulate substantive rules of decision, federal common law exists
only in such narrow areas as those concerned with the rights and obligations of the United
States, interstate and international disputes implicating the conflicting rights of States or
our relations with foreign nations" and admiralty); Woodward Governor Co. v. Curtiss
Wright Flight Sys., Inc., 164 F.3d 123, 127 (2d Cir. 1999) (illustrating that "federal common
law applies only where there is a 'significant conflict between some federal policy . . . and
the use of state law"'); Alcan Aluminum Corp. v. United States, 165 F.3d 898, 902 (Fed.
Cir. 1999) (maintaining limitations on the use of federal common law in diversity cases);
Moriarty v. Svec, 164 F.3d 323, 328 (7th Cir. 1998) (same); Kobatake v. E. DuPont De
Nemours & Co., 162 F.3d 619, 624 n.3 (11th Cir. 1998) (same); FDIC v. Gladstone,
44 F. Supp. 2d 81, 86-87 (D. Mass. 1999) (same); Meoli v. American Med. Servs. of San
Diego, 35 F. Supp. 2d 761, 765 (S.D. Cal. 1999) (same).
149. See Hodges, 44 F.3d at 339 (recognizing that "Congress explicitly preserved air-
lines' duty to respond to tort actions, inferentially state law actions, for physical injury or
property damage") (emphasis added); see also id. (observing that state tort laws are en-
forced under its analysis); Williams v. United States, 50 F.3d 299, 307-08 (4th Cir. 1995)
(stating that state law governs duties owed by landowners); Schock v. United States,
56 F. Supp. 2d 185, 191 (D.R.I. 1999) (recognizing that a state "enjoys the power to chart
its own course in the law of torts"); Koffman v. Osteoimplant Tech., Inc., 182 B.R. 115,
123 (D. Md. 1995) (observing that tort claims affect state law standards); International
Ass'n of Heat & Frost Insulators & Asbestos Workers Local Union 42 v. Absolute Envtl.
Servs. Inc., 814 F. Supp. 392, 399 (D. Del. 1993) (noting that tort duties are imposed by
state law).
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The Supreme Court in Morales and Wolens was concerned that the
states would impose substantive standards of law on airlines' prices,
routes, and services."5 Unlike with tort claims, the Wolens court recog-
nized that it is not state law, but the parties' agreement, which allows one
party to recover against an airline for breach of contract."' The Wolens
Court found that judicial enforcement of those private terms did not
amount to the state enforcing its substantive standards.152
In tort cases, however, it is the substantive law of the state that dictates
the duties owed and whether one is liable in tort."' Further, the imposi-
tion of state-created duties upon airlines, through judicially fashioned
150. See American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 226-27 (1995). The Court
recognized that "[t]he [Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Piactices] Act is
prescriptive; it controls the primary conduct of those falling within its governance. This
Illinois Law, in fact, is paradigmatic of the consumer protection legislation underpinning
the NAAG guidelines [at issue in Morales]." Id. at 227 (emphasis added). Continuing, the
Court noted that the NAAG Guidelines illustrate that the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act
"does not simply give effect to bargains offered by the airlines and accepted by the airline
customers." Id. at 228. The Illinois Consumer Fraud Act serves as a governing structure
on the practices of the airlines. See id. "[Rlead together with the FAA's saving clause,"
the preemption clause
stops States from imposing their own substantive standards with respect to rates,
routes, or services .... The distinction between what the State dictates and what
the airline itself undertakes confines courts, in breach-of-contract actions, to the
parties' bargain, with no enlargement or enhancement based on state laws or poli-
cies external to the agreement.
Id. at 232-33 (emphasis added).
151. See id. at 232-33.
152. See id. at 228-29 (recognizing that "terms and conditions airlines offer and pas-
sengers accept are privately ordered obligations and thus do not amount to a State's en-
actment or enforcement of any law, rule, regulation, standard, or other provision having
the force and effect of law within the meaning of [the ADA]") (internal quotations, altera-
tions, and footnote omitted); cf. Smith v. Comair, Inc., 134 F.3d 254, 258 (4th Cir. 1998).
The Smith court refused to give Wolens controlling effect where the defendant airline
raised federal law and federal administrative rules as a defense, because in order to de-
termine whether the airline breached its contract, the court would have to look those fed-
eral laws and regulations, which are beyond the terms of the parties' agreement. See id.
153. See supra note 151 and accompanying text (describing tort duties as a matter of
state law); see also In re TMI, 67 F.3d 1103,1106-07 (3d Cir. 1995). The court in TMI held
that federal law preempts state tort law because tort law imposes state duties. See id. The
court addressed whether the Price-Anderson Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-
408, 102 Stat. 1066, dealing with liability resulting from nuclear accidents, called for the
preemption of state tort law with respect to duties imposed. See id. The TMI court
spelled out the nature of duties in tort, namely that they are substantive standards pre-
scribed by the states and, in relation to the specific federal legislation, are preempted. See
id.
For an interesting passage on the differences between actions sounding in tort and
breach of contract, see Public Service Enterprise Group, Inc. v. Philadelphia Electric Co.,
722 F. Supp. 184, 198-99 (D.NJ. 1989) (citing Iron Mountain Sec. Storage Corp. v. Ameri-
can Specialty Foods, Inc., 457 F. Supp. 1158 (E.D. Pa. 1978)).
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damage awards, amounts to state enforcement of substantive standards
of state law,' having the effect of directing the airlines' to conform af-
firmatively to those standards.'55
154. See Wolens, 513 U.S. at 228-29. The Supreme Court in Wolens held that a breach
of contract exception to preemption under the ADA is warranted because damages are
awarded based upon the self-imposed obligations of the parties, not overriding state law
policies. See id. The converse of this exception is necessarily true: that where the parties
do not self-impose obligations, but rather a state imposes them, the ADA preempts these
obligations. See id.; see also Smith, 134 F.3d at 258 (holding that the plaintiff's breach of
contract claim was preempted because it could "only be adjudicated by reference to law
and policies external to the parties' bargain and, therefore, is preempted under the
ADA").
Judge Jolly, concurring in Hodges, determined that "[tihe tort system is not 'government
imposed': liability under the common law for negligence does not depend upon any ex-
pression of a legislative or executive agency of any state." Hodges v. Delta Airlines, Inc.,
44 F.3d 334, 341 n.2 (5th Cir. 1995) (en banc) (Jolly, J., concurring). Judge Jolly's blanket
assertion is contradictory to case law because it fails to include the judiciary as one of the
co-equal branches of government with the authority to enforce substantive standards of
state law. Cf Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 504 (1996) (Breyer, J., concurring)
(recognizing that standards of care on behavior are imposed by state law tort actions); cf
also Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 521 (1992) (plurality opinion); San Di-
ego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garman, 359 U.S. 236, 247 (1959) (holding that state "regula-
tion can be as effectively exerted through an award of damages as through some form of
preventive relief. The obligation to pay compensation can be, indeed is designed to be, a
potent method of governing conduct and controlling policy.") (emphasis added); Harris v.
Ford Motor Co., 110 F.3d 1410, 1414 n.8 (9th Cir. 1997) (recognizing that imposition of
damages under state tort law is a form of state regulation, and relying on Justice Breyer's
concurrence in Medtronic); Lynnbrook Farms v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 79 F.3d 620,
627 (7th Cir. 1996) (same); Papas v. Upjohn Co., 926 F.2d 1019, 1022 (11th Cir. 1991),
rev'd on other grounds, Papas v. Zoecon Corp., 505 U.S. 1215 (1992) (same); Lewis v.
Brunswick Corp., 922 F. Supp. 613, 615 (S.D. Ga. 1996) (same); DerGazarian v. Dow
Chem. Co., 836 F. Supp. 1429,1434 (W.D. Ark. 1993) (same, quoting Ferebee v. Chevron
Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529 (D.C. Cir. 1984)); Burke v. Dow Chem. Co., 797 F. Supp. 1128,
1131-32 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (same); Jordan v. Paccar, Inc., 792 F. Supp. 545, 547 (N.D. Ohio
1992) (same); Thornton v. Fondren Green Apartments, 788 F. Supp. 928, 931 (S.D. Tex.
1992) (same).
155. See Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 388 (1992). In Morales,
the Supreme Court was also concerned that the NAAG Guidelines affirmatively con-
trolled the practices of the airlines. See id. In Wolens, it was the Illinois Consumer Fraud
and Deceptive Business Practices Act that directed the airlines to conform to certain stan-
dards of conduct. See Wolens, 513 U.S. at 227-28 (recognizing that, like the NAAG
Guidelines at issue in Morales, the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act "highlight[s] the potential
for intrusive regulation of airline business practices inherent in state consumer protection
legislation"); see also TMI, 67 F.3d at 1106-07 (holding that state tort law imposes state
duties).
In construing the ADA's preemption clause, the Morales Court relied on similar provi-
sions in the ERISA statute to conclude that the ADA has a broad preemptive purpose.
See Morales, 504 U.S. at 383-86. In its analysis, the Court noted that ERISA preempts
common law tort suits. See id. at 386. Numerous other cases have interpreted the ERISA
statute to preempt state law tort claims. See, e.g., Electro-Mechanical Corp. v. Ogan,
9 F.3d 445, 450 (6th Cir. 1993) (finding tort action preempted by ERISA); Spain v. Aetna
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B. Personal Injury Tort Claims that Allege Bodily Injuries or Death:
Implicit Survival from ADA Preemption?
Taking the Supreme Court's interpretation of the ADA in Morales and
Wolens to its logical end, it appears that the ADA preempts all claims
that have something more than a tenuous connection to airline services,
and that seek to effectuate state policies or impose substantive stan-
dards. Such a broad interpretation leads to the conclusion that the
ADA preempts all personal injury claims based on state tort law because
awarding damages in tort imposes state duties and amounts to state
regulation.'57 The lower courts have not adopted such an expansive view,
however. Indeed, the Wolens Court recognized that personal in-
jury/safety claims would probably survive preemption. 9
Life Ins. Co., 11 F.3d 129, 132 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding wrongful death and general tort
claims preempted by ERISA); Corcoran v. United HealthCare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321, 1339
(5th Cir. 1992) (holding wrongful death claims preempted under ERISA); Fugarino v.
Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., 969 F.2d 178, 186 (6th Cir. 1992) (finding state com-
mon law tort claims preempted by ERISA); Settles v. Golden Rule Ins. Co., 927 F.2d 505,
507 (10th Cir. 1991) (finding tort of outrage, fraud and wrongful death claims preempted
by ERISA); Harper v. R.H. Macy & Co., 920 F.2d 544, 546 (8th Cir. 1990) (holding com-
mon law tort claims preempted under ERISA); Chicago Truck Drivers, Helpers & Ware-
house Workers Union (Indep.) Pension Fund v. Brotherhood Labor Leasing, 950 F. Supp.
1454, 1460-61 (E.D. Mo. 1996) (tort claims preempted by ERISA). But see Wilson v.
Zoellner, 114 F.3d 713 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding tort of negligent misrepresentation not
preempted by ERISA because the tort claims were too remote, tenuous, or peripheral to
have preemptive effect under ERISA). If the ADA and ERISA have an identical scope
of preemption, see Morales, 504 U.S. at 384, it follows then that state law tort claims are
preempted by the ADA to the extent they relate to the prices, routes, or services of an
airline. See 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b) (1994 & Supp. III).
156. See generally Hodges, 44 F.3d at 338 (suggesting that taking the ADA's preemp-
tion clause "to its logical extreme ... suggest[s] that a lawsuit following a fatal airplane
crash could relate to 'services'..." and hence, be subject to preemption); see also supra
note 155 (interpreting the imposition of state tort duties as a form of state regulation).
157. See Garman, 359 U.S. at 247 (stating that judicially awarded damages are a form
of state regulation designed as a "potent method of governing conduct"); see also supra
note 155. The Supreme Court in Morales held that laws of general applicability, even if
consistent with federal law, are preempted if they relate to rates, routes, or services of an
airline. See Morales, 504 U.S. at 385-87. Indeed, state tort laws are laws of general appli-
cability, see Harris, 110 F.3d at 1410, that seek to impose state obligations, see supra notes
150 & 154, and that result, effectively, in state regulation. See Garman, 359 U.S. at 247; see
also supra note 155. Morales brings state tort law within the gamut of the ADA's preemp-
tion clause, as state tort law are laws of general applicability, even though they may be
consistent with federal law. See Morales, 504 U.S. at 385-87.
158. See, e.g., Hodges, 44 F.3d at 388 (refusing to recognize the preemption of all state
tort actions by the ADA). But see Wolens, 513 U.S. at 229 n.5 (pointing out that the
United States recognized that enforcing state law refers to "binding standards of conduct
that operate irrespective of any private agreement").
159. See Wolens, 513 U.S. at 231 n.7 (recognizing that federal law requires airlines to
carry liability insurance to cover claims for personal injuries, and that American Airlines
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The lower courts often base their reasoning that personal injury claims
escape preemption both on Supreme Court dicta and on statutes associ-
ated with the regulation of the airline industry." Some of the lower
courts have relied on a compulsory liability insurance statute found in
the United States Code161 to find a way for bodily injury claims that relate
to services to proceed despite the ADA's preemption clause.62  This
statute, relied upon in Hodges, requires airlines to carry insurance, or be
self-insured, in the event the airline becomes liable for any claim of bod-
ily injury or death arising from the operations or maintenance of an air-
craft.
163
Judicial enforcement of tort duties, in the form of damage awards
against airlines on claims relating to airlines' services is equal to the im-
position of state standards of conduct.' 6 Morales and Wolens illustrate
that the ADA preemption clause prohibits the states from imposing
standards of substantive state law.16  The plain language of the ADA
preemption clause and the Supreme Court's broad interpretation thus
and the United States acknowledged that safety related personal injury claims would not
likely be preempted); see also id. at 242 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part). Although Justice O'Connor appeared to favor an all-inclusive interpretation of the
ADA's preemption clause, resulting in the preemption of nearly all state law claims, she
did instruct that her view of preemption "does not mean that personal injury claims
against airlines are always pre-empted." Id. Additionally, she observed that "[m]any
cases since Morales have allowed personal injury claims to proceed, even though none has
said that a State is not 'enforcing' its 'law' when it imposes tort liability on an airline." Id.
(emphasis added). Justice O'Connor's statements imply that, even if some personal injury
claims do not fall victim to preemption under the ADA, imposing state tort liability is con-
sidered an enforcement of state law on the airlines.
160. See Hodges, 44 F.3d at 338.
161. See 49 U.S.C. § 41112(a) (1994).
162. See Wolens, 513 U.S. at 231 n.7; see also Hodges, 44 F.3d at 338. In relying on the
insurance statute, 49 U.S.C. § 41112(a), the Hodges court created a dichotomy between
claims that relate to "services" of an airline, and claims that relate to the "operations or
maintenance" of the airline. See id. at 338-40. This distinction has not been well received.
See id. at 340, 342 (Jolly, J., concurring) (noting that the distinction between "operations
and maintenance" and "services" is elusive and promises uncertain results, as demon-
strated by the fact that the majority and dissent in the case disagreed on the application of
the insurance statute); see also Charas v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 160 F.3d 1259, 1263
n.3 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc) (agreeing with Judge Jolly of the Fifth Circuit that a distinc-
tion between operations/maintenance and services is an unworkable standard).
For an interesting discussion on the dichotomy created in Hodges and its relation to
"services," see Volluz, supra note 10, at 1218-21.
163. See 49 U.S.C. § 41112(a) (1994).
164. See cases cited supra notes 150, 154-55 and accompanying text (articulating the
nature and regulatory effect of state tort law).
165. See supra note 152 (quoting the relevant language from Wolens demonstrating
that state imposed obligations are preempted by the ADA).
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preempt state tort claims.'6 The ADA preemption clause, read together
with the saving clause 67 and the statute that requires airlines to carry li-
ability insurance for bodily injury or death, implicitly allows personal in-
.161
jury and death claims that relate to services to survive.
C. If Bodily Injury and Death Claims Implicitly Survive Preemption
Under the ADA, Does it Follow that Other Non-Bodily Injury Tort
Claims Also Survive?
Accepting as true the proposition that bodily injury and death claims
relating to airlines' services implicitly survive ADA preemption, a ques-
tion arises as to whether non-bodily injury tort claims also survive. The
answer turns on whether a court entering judgment in favor of a plaintiff
for a non-bodily injury claim relating to airline services is, or has the ef-
fect of, enforcing state law.
69
Tort duties imposed by state substantive law against the airlines, and
the accompanying judicial damage awards, are matters preempted by the
ADA because imposition of those duties and damages amounts to state
166. See Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 384 (1992) (adopting the
same standard of preemptive breadth as in ERISA cases). The ERISA statute preempts
tort claims brought under state law that relate to employee benefit plans. See supra note
156 (citing cases). The Court in Morales found that ERISA is an appropriate statute to
compare to the ADA and, indeed, cited to cases that demonstrate preemption of tort
claims under ERISA. See Morales, 504 U.S. at 384, 386. In relying on ERISA to construe
the scope of the ADA's preemption clause, and by citing cases that preempt state tort
claims under ERISA, the Morales Court held, at least inferentially, that tort claims relat-
ing to the services of an airline are also preempted. See id.; see also supra notes 154-55
(pointing out that state tort laws seek to impose state obligations resulting in regulation by
the state).
167. See Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-706, § 1106, 52 Stat. 973, 1027
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.); see also 49 U.S.C. § 40120(c).
168. See American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. at 231 n.7 (1995); see also Hodges
v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 44 F.3d 334, 338 (5th Cir. 1995 (en banc). But 4f Charas v. Trans
World Airlines, Inc., 160 F.3d 1259, 1263 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc) (adopting Judge
O'Scannlain's view in Gee on the "operations or maintenance" and "services" dichotomy);
Gee v. Southwest Airlines, 110 F.3d 1400, 1410 (9th Cir. 1997) (O'Scannlain, J., concur-
ring) (arguing that state tort claims survive not because of the compulsory insurance stat-
ute and a problematic dichotomy between service and operations/maintenance, rather be-
cause Congress simply did not intend to supplant state tort law with the ADA).
169. As demonstrated supra in Part II.B, judicial enforcement of state law tort claims
does have the effect of imposing substantive standards of state law and amounts to a form
of state regulation. See supra notes 150, 154-55 and accompanying text. However, bodily
injury and death claims may survive preemption, see supra Part III.B, based on the com-
pulsory insurance statute. See 49 § U.S.C. 41112(a). This statute, however, only requires
insurance for the bodily injury or death of a person. See id. The statute does not require
airlines to carry or provide insurance for non-bodily injury claims. See id.
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enforcement of its laws.' 7 To overcome preemption in the case of bodily
injury or death claims, courts have found different ways around the pre-
emption clause. First, courts have determined that the claims do not re-
late to prices, routes, or services. '71 Second, courts have found claims to
be too tenuous, remote, or peripheral to prices, routes, or services to im-
plicate the preemptive effect of the ADA.'72 Finally, courts have relied
on other provisions of the United States Code or federal regulations to
infer an implied cause of action. 173
Deferring to related provisions of the United States Code or federal
regulations, however, does not allow courts to imply a cause of action for
non-bodily injury claims as it does for bodily injury or death claims. This
situation exists because there appears to be no related provisions in title
49 of the United States Code, or in the Federal Aviation Regulations, that
give plaintiffs an implied private right of action against an airline for
damages resulting from non-bodily injuries. The same authority that al-
lows courts to find that bodily injury or death claims survive ADA pre-
emption' 74 does not appear to be available in the case of non-bodily in-
jury torts. Based on this analysis of the nature of tort law and the broad
preemptive effect of the ADA's preemption clause, the ADA appears to
preempt non-bodily injury tort claims that relate to services.' 75
170. See supra section III.B (discussing the nature of and regulatory effect of state tort
law).
171. See Hodges, 44 F.3d at 340 (finding plaintiff's claim related to operations and
maintenance of aircraft, rather than services of the airline).
172. See, e.g., West v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 995 F.2d 148, 151 (9th Cir. 1993) (find-
ing plaintiff's claim for wrongful exclusion from a flight related to airline services in too
tenuous, remote, or peripheral a way to be preempted by the ADA); see also Wolens, 513
U.S. at 242 (O'Connor, J. concurring in part, dissenting in part).
173. See Wolens, 513 U.S. at 231 n.7; see also Hodges, 44 F.3d at 338; supra note 169
(discussing reliance on a compulsory insurance statute).
174. See Wolens, 513 U.S. at 231 n.7; Hodges, 44 F.3d at 338.
175. This result brings domestic aviation jurisprudence in line with international avia-
tion jurisprudence. Consider U.S. jurisprudence under the Convention for the Unification
of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation by Air, Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat.
3000, 137 L.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter Warsaw Convention]. For the reader's convenience, the
text of the Warsaw Convention may also be found in a note following 49 U.S.C. § 40105
(1994).
The Warsaw Convention applies to, among other things, international transportation of
persons by air. See Warsaw Convention, art. 1(1). The contract (ticket) between the indi-
vidual and the airline determines whether the individual is engaged in international travel.
See id. art. 1(2). Hypothetically, if a person purchases a ticket from New York City, with
an intermediate stop in San Francisco, to an ultimate destination in Japan, the person
would be considered an international passenger on all legs of his or her journey. See id.
Under article 17 of the Warsaw Convention, an airline "shall be liable for damage sus-
tained in the event of the death or wounding of a passenger or any other bodily injury suf-
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IV. SOLVING THE DEFINITIONAL PROBLEMS AND CLEARLY
DELINEATING THE SCOPE OF PREEMPTION UNDER THE AIRLINE
DEREGULATION ACT OF 1978
A. Narrow or Broad: Which Definition of Services Best Serves Congress'
Purpose of Deregulating the Airline Industry?
Discerning the true definition of the term "services" is crucial to de-
fining the ADA's preemptive scope because, by its terms, the ADA's
preemption clause is not triggered if a claim does not relate to prices,
routes, or services of an airline.76  As a definitional matter, without
knowing what the term "services" encompasses, courts and litigants are
uncertain as to the outer limits of preemption under the ADA. ' A re-
view of the circuit court decisions addressing the scope of ADA preemp-
tion demonstrates as much.'
If the definition of "services" is as limited as it is in Charas, many more
state court claims will survive the ADA's preemptive effect because they
fered by a passenger, if the accident which caused the damage so sustained took place"
during the transportation. Id. art. 17. The Supreme Court has determined that injuries to
passengers must occur in the context of an accident, see Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392,
405 (1985), that an individual may only recover under the Warsaw convention for physical
injuries, see Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 553 (1991), and that the Warsaw
Convention provides the exclusive remedies to passengers for the injuries that fall within
its purview, i.e., physical injuries. See El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. Tseng, 119 S. Ct. 662,
668, 675 (1999).
If the ADA does not preempt non-bodily injury state law tort claims, it is out-of-line
with Warsaw Convention jurisprudence. See id. Consider Wallman v. Tower Air, Inc., No.
C-99-0557 MJJ (N.D. Cal. filed Feb. 4, 1999), currently sub judice in the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Northern District of California. In Waltman, the plaintiff stated that a
flight leaving New York, bound for San Francisco, experienced an engine fire requiring
the flight to make an emergency landing. See id. Compl. 11 11, 16. The plaintiff alleges
that the airline is liable to her in tort for mental or psychic injuries, occasioned by no
physical injury or death. See id. Compl. $ 30, Causes of Action I-III.
The causes of action for alleged "mental" or "psychic" injuries, should they survive
ADA preemption and be proven by the plaintiff, would result in the disparate treatment
of any individuals engaged in international transportation, e.g., individuals who began
their journey with the airline in Tel Aviv, Israel, having an intermediate stop in New York,
with a final destination of San Francisco. Domestic travelers would have a cause of action,
but anyone on the flight engaged in international transportation would be foreclosed from
pursuing "mental" or "psychic" tort claims against the airline.
176. See 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1)-(4)(A) (1994); see also Travel All Over the World v.
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 73 F.3d 1423,1433 (7th Cir. 1996) (finding defamation claim did
not trigger preemption because it did not relate to defendant airline's services).
177. Compare Charas v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 160 F.3d 1259, 1261 (9th Cir. 1998)
(construing a limited definition of "services"), with Hodges, 44 F.3d at 336 (finding a broad
definition of "services").
178. See supra Part II.C (discussing cases confronting the ADA's preemption clause
and the varying interpretations and results).
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will not relate to "services" as required by the statute.79 On the other
hand, if the definition is as broad as defined in Hodges, many more mat-
ters could fall victim to preemption."s The ADA's preemptive purpose is
to "ensure that the States would not undo federal deregulation with
regulation of their own,"'' 8' and "leave largely to the airlines themselves,
and not at all to [the] States" the proper standards of conduct in provid-
ing air transportation services.' With no clear guidance from the Su-
preme Court on Congress' intent with respect to the definition of "serv-
ices," the proper interpretation of that term to serve Congress' intent
remains unknown.' Either the Court must construe the term, or Con-
gress must define clearly what it intended "services" to mean. Other-
wise, courts will continue to interpret the ADA preemption clause and
its scope differently.s'
B. Can Non-Bodily Injury Tort Claims be Saved from the Effects of
ADA Preemption?
However one defines "services" under current authority, without ex-
press legislative or judicial direction, courts should interpret the ADA
preemption clause to preclude non-bodily injury tort claims.'85 Save for
179. See 49 U.S.C. § 41713 (requiring preemption of state enforcement actions related
to services); see also Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 384 (1992);
Wolens, 513 U.S. at 232.
180. See 49 U.S.C. § 41713 (1994); Smith v. Comair, Inc., 134 F.3d 254, 259 (1998)
(finding that the ADA preempted tort claims as they related to airline services of board-
ing); Travel All Over the World, 73 F.3d at 1434 (finding that the ADA preempted tort
claims as they related to service of transporting). This also assumes, of course, that the
courts cannot find any other reason to allow such claims to proceed, i.e. the claim is too
tenuous, remote, or peripheral to services, see Morales, 504 U.S. at 390, or the claim does
not ask the state to enforce its own substantive standards, see Wolens, 513 U.S. at 228-29.
181. Morales, 504 U.S. at 378.
182. See Wolens, 513 U.S. at 228.
183. See supra Part II.C. The Supreme Court has spoken on Congress' intent in en-
acting the ADA's preemption clause. See Morales, 504 U.S. at 378-79 (stating that it was
Congress intent to ensure the states would not regulate what Congress was deregulating);
see also Wolens, 513 U.S. at 228 (stating it was Congress intent to leave to the airlines ac-
ceptable standards of conduct in the services they provide).
184. Compare Smith, 134 F.3d at 259, and Travel All Over the World, 73 F.3d at 1434
(finding that tort claims preempted as related to airline services), with Charas v. Trans
World Airlines, Inc., 160 F.3d 1259, 1261 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc) (finding tort claims not
preempted because they were not related to airline services), and Hodges v. Delta Air-
lines, Inc., 44 F.3d 334, 338 (5th Cir. 1995) (en banc).
185. Although bodily injury and death claims implicitly survive preemption because of
a related statute, see, e.g., Wolens, 513 U.S. at 231 n.7; Hodges, 44 F.3d at 339, only those
claims that allege no bodily injury would remain subject to ADA preemption. See supra
Part III.C.
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an interpretation by the Supreme Court '86 that all tort claims escape pre-
emption because interpreting otherwise would be against congressional
intent, non-bodily injury claims that relate to such services should fall
victim to the ADA17
V. CONCLUSION
At best, ADA preemption jurisprudence is haphazard, checkered, and,
in many respects, uncertain. The lack of meaningful definitions of key
terms causes much difficulty in the ADA's application to state tort law.
In Morales and Wolens, the Court began to define the standard by which
lower courts should evaluate state law claims under the ADA preemp-
tion clause: the ADA preempts claims that result in the imposition of
state obligations on the airlines, but those claims that only seek enforce-
ment of the self-imposed obligations of the airlines escape preemption.
Although Supreme Court jurisprudence affords a sense of what the
ADA preempts, the limits of the ADA's preemptive effect remain
blurred. The evaluative standards and policies enunciated by the Su-
preme Court in Morales and Wolens, however, lead to the conclusion
that the ADA should preempt state tort claims alleging no bodily in-
jury.t 8 Until Congress or the courts define terms crucial to the applica-
186. Certainly, if it chose to do so, Congress could amend the ADA to exempt state
tort actions from the ADA's preemptive effect. As it stands now, however, the broad in-
terpretation of the ADA in Morales, and the narrow exception carved out in Wolens, lean
more toward preemption of state tort law, with the exception of bodily injury or death
claims. See, e.g., Wolens, 513 U.S. at 231 n.7; Hodges, 44 F.3d at 339; supra Part III.B; su-
pra note 170.
187. See supra Parts III.B-C; see also Smith v. Comair, Inc., 134 F.3d 254 (4th Cir.
1998). Perhaps adapting the language from Smith to the area of torts would state best the
underlying policy of preempting state tort law: "If passengers could challenge airlines'
boarding procedures under general [tort law,] ... we would allow the fifty states to regu-
late an area of unique federal concern-airline boarding practices." Id. at 258-59.
188. See Wolens, 513 U.S. at 228-29 (explaining that judicial enforcement of "privately
ordered obligations.., do not amount to a State's enactment or enforcement of any law,
rule, regulation, standard, or other provision having the force and effect of law within the
meaning of [the ADA]").
The Wolens Court further stated that "the ADA's preemption clause [does not] ... shel-
ter airlines from suits alleging no violation of state-imposed obligations," and allows for
claims "seeking recovery solely for the airline's alleged breach of its own, self-imposed
undertakings." Id. at 228. The converse of this statement is, arguably, that the ADA's
preemption clause does shelter airlines from suits alleging violations of state imposed obli-
gations, including state imposed tort duties and obligations. See supra notes 150,154-55.
Additionally, the Court accepted the posture of the United States, as amicus curiae, on
the issues presented in Wolens. See Wolens, 513 U.S. at 226, 228. In discussing the lan-
guage of the preemption clause, the United States suggested, and the Court seemed to ac-
cept, the assertion that the phrase "enact or enforce" is "naturally read to refe[r] to bind-
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tion of the ADA's preemption clause, thus placing passengers and air-
lines on notice of what claims and defenses they may properly assert, it is
likely that many more court decisions will yield inconsistent results.
ing standards of conduct that operate irrespective of any private agreement ... [and that]
States may not seek to impose their own public policies or theories of... regulation on the
operations of an air carrier." Id. at 229 n.5 (alteration in original) (internal quotations
omitted) (emphasis added); see also id. at 233 (explaining that the "distinction between
what the State dictates and what the airline itself undertakes confines courts, in breach-of-
contract actions, to the parties' bargain, with no enlargement or enhancement based on
state laws or policies external to the agreement") (emphasis added).
[Vol. 49:873
